Abstract-The management of congestion within the German transmission network has become more important during the last years. This emerging relevance is caused by the increase of renewable generation and the partial phase-out of nuclear power plants. Both developments yield a in the transmission flow pattern and henceforth the need for congestion management. Currently, four German transmission system operators (TSOs) are in charge of managing congestion using curative methods, particularly redispatch of power plants. However, the existence of four TSOs within Germany induces the question whether coordination between them in managing national congestion would be beneficial. To address this issue, we apply a generalized Nash equilibrium model to analyse different degrees of coordination, covering the German electricity market with a detailed representation of the generation and network structure. The results indicate that the costs of congestion management decrease in a rising degree of coordination as TSOs take into account congestion in other operators' zones. Total costs are highest in case each TSO is solely responsible for its own zone, and lowest if one integrated entity is in charge of mitigating congestion. We conclude that, in a setup with multiple TSOs, inducing coordination, for instance through a common market, has the potential of lowering the overall costs of congestion management.
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In order to deal with this issue of limited transmission capacity, congestion management methods are developed to ease line overflows either using technical or economic procedures.
[1] provides a literature survey on congestion management methods in deregulated electricity systems. Technical measures aim to increase the capacity by adjusting load flows in the transmission network through specific devices (for example FACTS, phase-shifting transformers, switching of transmission lines), thereby avoiding changes in demand and generation. On the other hand, there are economic methods, relying on adjusting nodal feed-ins (nodal generation and/or demand) to reduce line overloadings. Those latter methods can be divided according to their timing within the market clearing process into preventive and curative methods. Preventive measures are applied before or during the clearing of the daily electricity markets whereas curative methods are applied after final market clearing. Explicit and implicit auctions are exemplary preventive congestion management methods and are applied, for instance, in central western Europe for allocating crossborder transmission capacity, or in the US regional market of Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland (PJM) using a nodal pricing approach. Curative congestion management includes the redispatch of power plants based on the final market commitments, and counter-trading. These methods are applied in most national electricity markets in Europe to manage internal congestion issues.
Regarding the economic evaluation of these management methods, [2] provide a study in which they show that preventive as well as curative congestion management measures are equally efficient in the short term perspective. [3] analyze the economic effects of different pricing and congestion management regimes on the Italian electricity system. Their analysis shows that generation costs are identical among the investigated regimes, but the distribution of benefits and costs among market participants differs. Comparable analyses are performed in [4] for the German and in [5] for the European electricity system. The latter two analyses, in contrast to the previous studies, identify cost benefits from adjusting congestion management regimes: as the redispatch of power plants is restricted to national units, higher congestion management costs are observed than in a perfectly coordinated nodal pricing regime. The issue of coordination in congestion management among different transmission system operators (TSOs) is further investigated in [6] . The authors develop a generalized Nash equilibrium model which is able to reflect different degrees of coordination among regional TSOs. It is applied in [7] and [8] to stylized electricity systems. It is shown that the degree of coordination in congestion management affects redispatch costs.
In this paper, we build on the equilibrium model developed in [6] . In order to investigate different degrees of coordination among German TSOs in conducting national congestion management, we suggest a new method of solving the arising class of problems based on multiplicatively decomposing the multipliers of shared constraints. Towards gaining numerical insights, we employ a detailed representation of the German electricity system covering the high-voltage transmission network, which is divided into four balancing areas or zones each of which being managed independently by one of the four TSOs. The results reveal that the level of coordination among the four German TSOs in managing national congestion in the transmission network impacts congestion management costs. While the initial spot market dispatch of power plants and hence the congestion pattern are by construction identical among the considered cases, they diverge in the utilization of available redispatching resources. In a setup with perfect coordination -implemented by one single TSO responsible for all zones -a least-cost redispatch can be achieved. In the restricted cases with imperfect coordination between multiple TSOs, the redispatching volume and costs rise. This is particularly due to more expensive redispatch measures being required to ease overloadings in the transmission network.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section II introduces the economic redispatch model which captures the issue coordinating congestion management among multiple TSOs. The developed model is applied to a dataset covering the German electricity system. The underlying data are described in Section III. The results are presented and discussed in Section IV. Finally, Section V concludes.
II. THE MODEL
Our model consists of two stages: first, the electricity spot market is cleared by equalizing supply and demand in a cost-minimizing fashion without taking network limitations into account. Second, in the main stage, plants and load are redispatched to correct for network infeasibilities that potentially may have emerged. Our focus lies on this main congestion management phase for which we analyze three cases: an unrestricted benchmark case with one single TSO being responsible for redispatch across all zones, and two restricted cases with several TSOs, each of which being in charge for network feasibility -either across all zones or in its own zone only. In all three cases, the two stages are not connected by any kind of feedback mechanism, the pre-stage is solely supposed to create a market-clearing dispatch that serves as data for the model's main stage.
A. Pre-stage: market clearing
The power system consists of a set of nodes N = {n 1 , ..., n N } n at each of which there is inelastic demand q n and deterministic injection of wind, solar and biomass generation, g wind n , g solar n , g bio n . Residual demand is served by dispatchable plants p ∈ P = {p 1 , ..., p P } each of which being located at a certain node. Each conventional plant exhibits constant marginal generation costs c p and a maximum capacity of g max p . For convenience, we abstract from further technical features such as minimum generation requirements, ramping constraints and so forth. Note that renewables generation is neither subject to any uncertainty nor dispatchable, but enters the model as deterministic data. Exports to or imports from neighboring countries are taken into account implicitly by adjusting our demand data (see Section III). Mimicking the German market design, which features no explicit or implicit auctions of national transmission capacities, we model a uniform price across all nodes. Assuming perfect competition, the market is cleared on a power exchange run by a single cost minimizing entity, dispatching generation G p for each plant, thereby equalizing supply and residual demand without taking the power network into account:
where G p ≥ 0, and the multipliers κ p , ν ≥ 0 are given in parentheses. As the objective function (1) and the constraints (2), (3) are affine, we have an LP such that a solution is necessarily globally optimal. We denote the resulting dispatch of this pre-stage market clearing as vector
B. Unrestricted Case: a Single TSO
In the main stage of the model, the power network comes into play. In case the pre-stage market clearing outcome yields congestion on one or several lines, the TSO is in charge of relieving it. 2 Note that the firms owning the generating units do not have any discretion here: according to German law or wind power curtailment at nodes n ∈ N = {n 1 , ..., n N }. Remember that each plant is associated to a specific node. In this respect, let the subset of all plants connected to a node n be rendered by P(n) ⊂ P. Denote the redispatched quantity at each plant ∆G p ∈ R, and the amount of load shedding at a node by LS n ∈ R + , for wind curtailment W C n ∈ R + respectively. Note that redispatched quantities at each plant can be positive or negative. In our model, we regard load shedding as a kind of emergency measure, which a TSO can draw upon in case the actual resources do not suffice. This interpretation is backed up by German law, which allows such action as last resort to maintain system stability. 4 Marginal generation costs at plant p amount to c p , as above, whereas one MW unit of load shedding costs c LS , for wind curtailment c W C
respectively. The TSO's objective (4) consists in minimizing redispatching costs subject to several generation constraints: (5) prescribes that the overall changes in generation and load net out each other, whereas (6) - (7) establish that generation at each plant p may be no larger than its capacity limit g max p
, and nonnegative. Recall that g p represents the dispatched quantity from the market clearing stage. Restriction (8) ensures that wind power curtailment at node n is at most as large as the produced quantity g wind n . Network feasibility -the central issue of the problem -is expressed in condition (9): for each line l, the total flow, positive as well as negative, may be no larger than the line capacity p max l . Loop flows are captured with help of the PTDF 5 matrix, of which the (l, n)-element renders the fraction of the total flow from node n to a hub node through line l. Injection at a node n is given by the sum of the generation of all plants at n, the redispatched quantity, wind, solar, biomass generation g wind n , g solar n , g bio n , and load shedding quantity minus demanded quantity and wind curtailment quantity. The TSO's constrained optimization problems thus reads as follows:
−g wind n
4 German Energy Industry Act (EnWG) §13.2 5 Power transfer distribution factor where the multipliers in parentheses ρ ∈ R, λ
represent the shadow price of the respective constraint. The corresponding KKT conditions constitute a mixed linear complementarity problem:
Note that we have a linear objective function (4), and for (5) - (9) the linear constraint qualification holds. A solution for (10) - (18) is thus necessarily globally optimal.
C. Restricted Cases: Multiple TSOs
To expose the effect of coordination, in this subsection we divide the set of nodes into zones for each of which there exists one TSO solely able to manipulate quantities in its own zone. Each TSO is responsible to ensure its zonal system balance while he is restricted to the redispatching resources located in its zone. To this end, consider T zones within each of which a single tso ∈ T = {tso 1 , ..., tso T } is responsible for redispatching plants, or load and wind curtailment respectively. Note that each plant p is associated to a specific node n, and each node to a specific TSO. Thus, denote the subset of all nodes within the zone of a TSO by N (tso) ⊂ N , and recall the subset of all plants connected to a node n being denoted by P(n) ⊂ P. NTherefore, the set of all plants located within the zone of a certain TSO can be expressed as P (N (tso)). However, the TSOs influence each other via the shared constrained of network feasibility on which the actions of all TSOs have an effect for all lines. Keep in mind that a TSO redispatching in its zone causes an effect not only within that zone, but -due to loop flows -alters flows on all lines in all zones. To represent this setup as a generalized Nash game, let ∆G tso,p , W C tso,n , LS tso,n denote the redispatched quantities of tso at plant p, the wind curtailment of tso, and load shedding of tso at node n. Recall that the game is restricted insofar as manipulations at plants or nodes in a specific zone can only be undertaken by the respective TSO. The optimization problem again consists in minimizing redispatching costs under individual and shared constraints and for each player reads:
p∈P(N (tso))
Constraints (20) -(23) take effect for each TSO separately. Also note that the shared constraint -here the network restriction (24) -is specific for each TSO as the dual variables µ + tso,l and µ − tso,l allow for an individual valuation of the respective constraints. Mathematically, however, this yields an underdetermined system in the way it is typical for generalized Nash problems: identical constraints are valued differently by each player, therefore the problem consists of more free variables than distinct equations. To cope with that issue in an economically and mathematically sound manner, we modify the problem by assuming ex ante an exogenously different accounting of each player towards the shared constraintsintroduced through a coefficient γ l,tso ≥ 0. At the same time, we reduce the number of free variables by replacing the player-line-specific valuations µ − tso,l , µ + tso,l by only linespecific multiplier variables µ
In other words, we decompose the individual multipliers into a player-specific exogenous parametric part γ l,tso and an endogenous multiplier µ
Observe that the shared network restriction (24') is multiplied with γ l,tso . The corresponding KKT conditions for (19) - (23) and (24') can be formulated as mixed linear complementarity problem, ∀ tso the following set of conditions has to hold:
[LS tso,n − W C tso,n ] ⊥ ρ f ree, ∀tso
As explained above 6 , in this generalized Nash game, we introduce different degrees of coordination between the players exogenously with help of the parameters γ l,tso that reflect the valuation of the shared network restriction of line l by the respective TSO. We can now collect these parameters in a (L × T SO)-matrix Γ = [γ l,tso ]. For example, consider
In this case, tso 1 and tso 2 evaluate congestion on line 1 equally (first row), but tso 1 does not take into account congestion on line 2 at all (second row). 7 Recall that for each TSO the respective entry of Γ is multiplied with the shared network feasibility constraint of line l. In case of a zero-entry, the TSO thus does not "see" the line in its optimization problemcheck (32), (33).
For our analysis, we put forward two configurations of Γ. In version 'restricted coordinated' all TSOs are equally responsible for each line, which in turn implies that there exists coordination, e.g. through a common market with the same shadow prices across all players. This is implemented for Γ being a matrix of ones. In version 'restricted uncoordinated' each TSO takes into account only lines within its own zone 6 Note that -as long as γ l,tso > 0 for some tuple l, tso -(32), (33) do not lose or gain any information by being multiplied with γ l,tso as the left-hand inequality can always be divided by that gamma. The different ex ante valuations, however, take effect in (26) -(28) where they represent tso's sensibility towards the constraint's multiplier. 7 The entries of Γ are generally not restricted to γ l,tso ∈ {0, 1}, as we configure it in our application, but provide a high level of flexibility: for instance, the first row in the example could also be [2 1]. In that case, tso 1 would value congestion on line 1 twice as much as tso 2 .
and those running between its zone and a neighboring one. The according columns of Γ consist thus of zeros and ones at the respective entries. Recall that in any case each player's access is restricted to resources located in its own zone. Comparing our approach to the literature, [6] analyze a similar Generalized Nash framework, but implement a solution technique following [9] , requiring certain technical assumptions to be fulfilled. Contrary to their additive decomposition of the individual multipliers for the common constraints, our multiplicative approach provides an intuitive technique of implementing exogenous variations in the consideration of single lines by individual players. Moreover, our approach is capable to easily "switch off" the responsibility of players for specific constraints, i.e. lines, simply by the respective entry γ l,tso = 0.
III. DATA
The application of the described model covers the electricity system of Germany for the year 2011 with a detailed representation of the high-voltage transmission network. The topology of the German electricity network comprising substations and transmission lines is based on [10] and covers the balancing area of the four TSOs 50Hertz, Amprion, TenneT TSO, and TransnetBW. In order to reduce computational complexity, we concentrate our analysis solely on the German system and abstract from interactions with neighboring countries. 8 In constructing our grid topology and power transfer distribution factors, however, we take cross-border lines and lines within neighboring countries implicitly into account. 9 Thermal generation is considered on a block level and their capacities as well as locations are based on [11] . It is assumed that generation facilities are connected to the nearest substation. Generation facilities are characterized by their input fuel (nuclear, lignite, hard coal, gas, oil, hydro) and technology (steam process, gas turbine, combined cycle gas turbine). This information is used to calculate marginal generation costs based on fuel and emission costs weighted by the power plant specific efficiency of the generation process. As renewable energies are considered to be non-dispatchable, we directly use the total wind and solar generation of 2011 from [12] in an hourly resolution. Concerning biomass facilities, we assume constant generation at available capacity. In order to derive a regional renewable generation pattern, the locations of renewable installations [13] are used as proxy. For simplicity and tractability reasons, we assume a perfect positive correlation of renewable generation across the model regions. The same applies for regional demand where we break down the total hourly demand derived from [14] according to regional GDP and population. Our data for demand in Germany represent original values for each hour of 2011 and are complemented by hourly import and export quantities [14] .
IV. RESULTS
We run the unrestricted model and both variants of the restricted model -restricted coordinated and restricted uncoordinated -on our dataset for all 8760 hours of the year 2011. In a first step, we report which lines are subject to overload. Note that the geographical congestion pattern does not depend on the redispatch model, but is solely determined by the pre-stage market clearing outcome. line less than 700 hours, and black lines visualize overflows in more than 700 hours of the year 2011. Out of 563 lines, 42 are subject to congestion in at least one hour. The spatial pattern is generally in line with actual congestion reported by the German Federal Network Agency (BNetzA) monitoring report [15] : we reproduce frequent overflows on a line from Thuringia to Bavaria, in central Bavaria as well as in the north-western region of Germany. However, the congestion our model generates in the western/south-western area was not detected in the actual German 2011 data. Our findings (as well as the original 2011 data) represent a spatial dispersion within the German electricity system: the load centers in the south and south-west are remote from regions with excess generation, i.e.
the eastern lignite and northern wind generation areas. This imbalance leads to a high level of flows on the relevant lines and, together with a high voltage grid not constructed to serve this needs, thus to congestion on the respective lines. We now turn to the results of the model's main stage and analyze the outcomes with respect to redispatching costs and volumes. In this respect, redispatching costs describe the expenditures that accrue to a TSO for increasing generation plus compensation payments for load and wind curtailment, reduced by the received payments from generators that decrease their generation level. The redispatching volume comprises the absolute value of all generation changes in a model variant, i.e. positive and negative redispatch volumes, as well as load and wind curtailment quantities. Table I summarizes our findings.
Our central result is intuitive: total redispatching costs decrease with a higher degree of coordination. For the unrestricted model, redispatching costs amount to 30.36 million EUR, whereas for the restricted coordinated case, in which all TSOs are equally responsible for each lines but can only access own resources, they add up to 124.14 million EUR. This difference of roughly 96 million EUR can be attributed to coordination, for example by a common pool or market for redispatching resources. For the restricted uncoordinated model, where each TSO has access solely to own resources and moreover only takes care of congestion within its own zone, total redispatching costs amount to 179.56 million EUR. This difference of roughly 56 million EUR can thus be traced back to coordination, for instance through a common market for transmission capacity. Concerning the redispatch volume, no such clear picture emerges: total yearly quantity is lowest for the unrestricted model with about 7.66 TWh, compared to 11.01 TWh in the restricted coordinated model. Formally, this increase reflects the zonal energy balance (20): if each of the four players, instead of one TSO across all zones, has to respect this constraint separately, each redispatch measure must be balanced within a zone. Thus, it is not possible that curative actions directly set each other off in terms of the energy balance across zones. To illustrate this "zonal balance effect", consider a line l located in one zone and congested in direction west to east. A single TSO would, for example, lower generation at one plant at the western end of l and increase generation of a plant located east to it by the same amount. If, however, there are multiple TSOs and the eastern plant lies in another zone, both measures would not set off each other any more to keep up the respective zonal balance, and further quantities within both zones would have to be activated. In the restricted uncoordinated model, the total redispatch volume amounts to 8.54 TWh, which is between the other cases. On the one hand, due to the lack of coordination, measures in one zone could lead to new congestion in other zones, driving the volume up compared to the unrestricted case. On the other hand, as foreign TSOs are not responsible for congestion within a player's own zone, the zonal balance effect is not active, which reduces the redispatching volume compared to the coordinated restricted case. reveals, across the three models, the main fraction of the redispatch volume stems from changing plants' generation. Wind power curtailment and load shedding play only a minor role. The redispatching costs, which rise in absolute terms as coordination decreases, are mainly driven by the use of expensive load shedding, as visualized by Figure 3 . While in the unrestricted single TSO case, total costs and costs per unit are low, the high unit costs for the restricted models can be attributed to the increasing share of load shedding measures. Note in this context, however, that the highest level of load shedding, occurring in the restricted uncoordinated model, 10 Putting it abstract, assume the exemplary setup as in the text. Under the restricted coordinated model, minimally four generation units are necessary to relief congestion while respecting zonal balances, whereas in the unrestricted case and restricted uncoordinated model, minimally two plants are necessary. In the latter case, moreover, plants in foreign zones will never be utilized. Summing up, the level of coordination among the four German TSOs in managing national congestion in the transmission network strongly impacts congestion management costs. While the initial spot market dispatch of power plants and hence the congestion pattern are by construction identical among the considered cases, they diverge in the utilization of available redispatching resources. In a setup with perfect coordination -meaning one single TSO for all zones -the least-cost redispatch can be achieved. In the restricted cases with imperfect coordination between the separate TSOs, redispatching volumes and associated costs rise. Particularly, this is due to more expensive redispatch measures being required to ease overloadings in the transmission network. Hence, our results reveal that congestion management costs increase substantially with a lower degree of coordination. Through the implementation of market mechanisms for redispatching resources as well as transmission capacity, transparent valuations of common constraints in terms of market prices are achievable, which have the potential to increase the degree of coordination.
Our model and its application is subject to several limitations. Presented results thus have to be interpreted taking these into account. First, our modeling abstracts from intertemporal decisions inherent to electricity systems such as endogenous dispatch of pump-storage facilities. Second, it is a pure dispatch model and henceforth does not take into account limitations of generation units through unit commitment restrictions (e.g. minimum generation, online and offline time restrictions). However, accounting for these aspects, in particular for the binary character of the unit commitment, would require a reformulation of the complementarity problem to an equivalent optimization problem. Third, the determination of transmission flows is based on approximating an AC loadflow approach, and security aspects such as the N-1 criterion are not considered in an explicit manner. However, we approximate these points (N-1 criterion as well as reactive power flows) by a reduction of the available transmission capacity to 70%. Regarding the application of the model, outcomes are sensitive to input data. The data used here is based on publicly available sources, which entails that assumptions are required to break down national values on demand or renewable generation into regional levels. Furthermore, TSOs may also be able to accept temporary overloading of transmission lines or to adjust the network topology by switching actions which feeds back to congestion management costs. [4] shows that this flexibility reduces congestion management costs significantly as flows in the transmission network can be partially controlled. In the presented application we entirely abstract from these operational measures and assume a fixed network topology with defined transmission limits. Taking these aspects into account, it is per se unclear how results change: as further rigidities as well as flexibilities can potentially be included, no clear-cut statement can be given in which direction results would change.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The German electricity system spawns a spatial load and generation pattern inducing network congestion in an increasing number of hours [15] . One reason consists in the "Energiewende", the reorganization of generation towards renewable sources, together with a high voltage grid not yet reconstructed to serve the emerging needs. As a short term curative method, the redispatching of power plants can be a relief to line overflows. In our paper, we explore whether the different TSOs, which is a constitutive feature of the German electricity system, can create benefits by coordinating congestion management actions.
To this end, we set up a model in which one single TSO is responsible for the cost-minimal redispatch of plants under the constraint of network feasibility, after a dispatch pattern has been created as input data in a market clearing pre-stage. Disaggregating this entity into several players in charge of the same task, each having the exclusive access to resources in its geographical zone, yields a generalized Nash equilibrium model in the fashion of [6] . Here, our methodological contribution lies in the ex ante attribution of responsibilities of TSOs to lines, formally introduced by a matrix of scalars Γ. This approach provides a formal procedure to reduce the number of endogenous multipliers for identical shared constraints. Motivated by economic considerations, we thereby induce solvability of an otherwise underdetermined system of equations, and set up a simple and applicable method to tackle generalized Nash equilibrium problems.
Applying this setup to detailed German data concerning lines, plants, hourly demand, and hourly renewables generation for the year 2011, we are able to quantify the benefits of coordination: in case each TSO is responsible to relief congestion in its own zone with its own resources, annual redispatch costs of 180 million EUR accrue. Coordinating the use of transmission capacities yields annual costs of 124 million EUR. As a benchmark, one single unrestricted TSO across all zones would have to bear redispatch expenditures of 30 million EUR. In interpreting the results, however, there exist some caveats: our market clearing and redispatch model does not take into account several rigidities and flexibilities, such as ramping constraints, unit commitments or temporary line overloading. Specifically, numerical results are driven by the influence of costly load shedding emerging in the model's restricted cases. Future research is necessary to develop the framework at this point, for example by formally reinterpreting load shedding as demand-side participation. Nevertheless, we can conclude that coordination among the different players in charge of managing the power network has the potential for substantial cost savings.
